P332 · Safety & trust

Audience, Participation and Delivery Separation

Keep audience trust, permission to participate and permission to deliver as separate checks.

Editorially reviewed

These examples and illustrative results are independently authored teaching materials, not measured model results.

Use case

A group named Internal has authenticated external identity. Historical agent replies do not authorize responding to a human-directed question or posting internal traces.

Mechanism

Resolve platform/workspace/channel from trusted adapters and apply observation policy. Separately check current participation, audience-visible content and delivery authority; explicit requests still follow policy and history grants no consent. Recheck full destination/grant before send/edit/stream fragments, reassessing changed targets. Unknown audiences remain external-safe.

Bad example

Internal display name/prior bot replies authorize debugging posts and unsolicited human-thread participation.

Good example

Use real external identity. Stay quiet for human-addressed messages; answer agent-directed requests only within policy with business content. Keep internal traces on verified operator surfaces and recheck every delivery/changed target.

Why the change matters

Read, participation and delivery permissions differ. Trusted identity/transport checks prevent labels/history/target changes from expanding authority.

Observable expectation

Teaching human-addressed messages remain quiet, authorized requests get scoped answers and C1→C2 needs new destination checks. Internal exceptions/approval metadata stay out of external content. Unsent scenarios are designs only.

Limits

Prose does not enforce transport; cover sends/edits/streams/helpers. Policy varies and DMs are not automatically internal. No messages are authorized/sent here.

Sources and evidence

Read the editorial criteria